American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 23

Issue 4

Article 5

2015

The Resurgence of Forced Labor: How the Sixth Circuit's Decision
in United States v. Toviave Endorses the Exploitation of Children
Sophia K. Niazi
American University Washington College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Juvenile Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Niazi, Sophia K. (2015) "The Resurgence of Forced Labor: How the Sixth Circuit's Decision in United States
v. Toviave Endorses the Exploitation of Children," American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy &
the Law: Vol. 23 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

The Resurgence of Forced Labor: How the Sixth Circuit's Decision in United
States v. Toviave Endorses the Exploitation of Children
Cover Page Footnote
Publications Editor, Vol. 24, American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law; Juris Doctor
Candidate, May 2016, American University Washington College of Law; Bachelor of Arts in Foreign Affairs,
2011, University of Virginia. My thanks to Professor Janie Chuang for her input and advice on this
Comment; my editors for their suggestions; and a very special thank you to my parents for their
encouragement, love, and support.

This article is available in American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law:
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss4/5

Niazi: Resurgence of Forced Labor

THE RESURGENCE OF FORCED LABOR:
HOW THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
IN UNITED STATES V. TOVIAVE
ENDORSES THE EXPLOITATION OF
CHILDREN
SOPHIA K. NIAZI
I. Introduction ............................................................................................686
II. Background ...........................................................................................688
A. The Role of the Federal Forced Labor Statute in Toviave
and Beyond ..............................................................................688
1. Interpreting What Constitutes Forced Labor Under §
1589 ...................................................................................689
B. The Federal Involuntary Servitude Statute.................................690
C. Michigan’s Laws Regarding Child Abuse, Labor, In Loco
Parentis ....................................................................................692
D. The Sixth Circuit Court Decision in United States v.
Toviave ....................................................................................693
III. Analysis ...............................................................................................694
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Three Arguments in Toviave Fail to
Distinguish This Case From Those Concerning Forced
Labor........................................................................................694
1. The Sixth Circuit Incorrectly Argues That Making
Children Do Household Chores Cannot Be Forced
Labor Without “Making Responsible Parents and
Guardians into Federal Criminals” ....................................694
2. Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s Decision, Using Abuse to
Compel a Child to Do Chores Changes the Nature of
 Publications Editor, Vol. 24, American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy
& the Law; Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2016, American University Washington
College of Law; Bachelor of Arts in Foreign Affairs, 2011, University of Virginia. My
thanks to Professor Janie Chuang for her input and advice on this Comment; my editors
for their suggestions; and a very special thank you to my parents for their
encouragement, love, and support.

685

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

1

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 5

686

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 23:4

the Housework ...................................................................697
3. Federalization of the State-Regulated Area of Child
Abuse Would Not Occur if the Facts of Toviave Were
to Constitute Forced Labor ................................................701
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Use of 18 U.S.C. § 1584 as an Analogy
to the Forced Labor Statute Was Incorrect ..............................704
C. Toviave Did Not Possess Parental Rights Over the Children ....708
IV. Policy Recommendation ......................................................................709
V. Conclusion ............................................................................................710

I. INTRODUCTION
Typically, household chores performed by children in their own homes,
under reasonable conditions and under the supervision of family members
or caregivers, comprise an important part of family life.1 However, when
the workload becomes excessive or begins to interfere with a child’s
education it becomes indistinguishable from child labor.2 Child labor can
amount to forced labor under certain conditions.3 Generally, forced labor
involves individuals who are forced against their will to perform work or
service under the threat of some form of punishment.4 The problem of
forced labor does not exist solely in underdeveloped countries; rather, in
developed economies, including the United States, 1.5 million people are
currently subjected to forced labor.5 After the abolition of slavery, the
United States passed the Thirteenth Amendment recognizing the
importance in protecting U.S. citizens and residents against involuntary
1. See Child Labour and Domestic Work, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/areas/Childdomesticlabour/lang—en/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 6, 2014) (distinguishing between children performing household chores in their
own home and children performing domestic work in a third party household).
2. See id. (stating that concerns may arise when a child’s household workload
interferes with the child’s education or becomes excessive).
3. See What are Child Labor and Forced Labor?, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOUR,
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/child-forced-labor/What-are-Child-Labor-and-ForcedLabor.htm (last visited May 5, 2015) (explaining that forced labor applies to both
children and adults who perform all types of work or service, including legal and
formal employment if performed under menace of penalty and involuntarily).
4. See
What
is
Forced
Labour?,
ANTI-SLAVERY
INT’L,
http://www.antislavery.org/english/slavery_today/forced_labour.aspx (last visited Oct.
6, 2014) (detailing that forced labor is most commonly found in labor intensive and/or
under-regulated industries such as agriculture, manufacturing, and domestic work).
5. See id. (explaining that the developed economies of the United States, Canada,
Australia, European Union, Japan, and New Zealand constitute seven percent of the
world’s forced labor).
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servitude and forced labor.6 More recently, in 2008 Congress passed the
Federal Forced Labor Statute, which forbade knowingly providing or
obtaining labor services through a number of means.7
In a move arguably contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment, the court in
United States v. Toviave sealed the fate of the children residing in the Sixth
Circuit when it handed down its judgment reversing Jean Claude Kodjo
Toviave’s forced labor convictions.8 In determining whether Toviave’s
actions constituted forced labor, the Sixth Circuit oversimplified the
complex issue of what constitutes forced labor and, in particular, whether
common household chores may be considered forced labor.9 The Sixth
Circuit concluded that Toviave’s actions did not constitute forced labor,
reasoning that: (1) making children do household chores cannot be forced
labor without making “responsible American parents and guardians into
federal criminals;” (2) using child abuse to compel a child to do chores did
not change the nature of the work; and (3) if these actions constituted
forced labor it would federalize the state-regulated area of child abuse.10
This Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit erred in deciding Toviave
because it separated the issues of child abuse and forced labor instead of
looking at the totality of the situation.11 Toviave evidently used abuse as a
coercive method to make the children under his care perform household
chores.12 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit should have ruled in favor of the
United States and affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that forced labor was
used as a means to control the children.13 Part II examines the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning in Toviave and explores the Federal Forced Labor
Statue, the Federal Involuntary Servitude Statute, as well as Michigan’s

6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (stating, in part, that “[n]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States . . .”).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008) (detailing what constitutes forced labor and how
it should be punished).
8. See United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 623 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that
forcing children to do household chores through child abuse did not constitute forced
labor under 18 U.S.C. § 1589).
9. See id. at 625 (finding that aside from the abuse, the facts described nothing
more than household chores).
10. See id. (justifying its conclusion that “[a]lthough Toviave’s treatment of his
children was reprehensible, it did not constitute forced labor”).
11. See id. (stating that the facts amount merely to household chores barring the
consideration of abuse).
12. See id. at 624 (asserting that Toviave used child abuse as a means to make the
children under his care follow his rules and complete chores).
13. See infra Part V (concluding that the Sixth Circuit erred in its reasoning when
it overturned the trial court’s conviction of forced labor).
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current child abuse laws.14 Part III argues that the Sixth Circuit incorrectly
interpreted the Forced Labor Statute and mistakenly compared the Forced
Labor Statute with the Involuntary Servitude Statute.15 Part IV presents a
policy argument for applying the Forced Labor Statute in situations of in
loco parentis.16 Finally, Part V concludes that the Sixth Circuit should
have applied the Federal Forced Labor Statute in Toviave which would
have led the court to conclude that Toviave was guilty of forced labor.17
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Role of the Federal Forced Labor Statute in Toviave and Beyond
The Sixth Circuit in Toviave argued that the federal government’s
interpretation of the Federal Forced Labor Statute would convert the
exercise of a parent’s right to his or her child’s services, as allowed in
Michigan law, into a federal crime.18 In developing its argument, the Sixth
Circuit treated the Forced Labor Statute as analogous to the Involuntary
Servitude Statute by analyzing case law and precedent.19 In doing so, the
court shifted its attention away from the Forced Labor Statute, which
explicitly outlines how extreme the situation would need to be in order for
household chores to cross the threshold into forced labor.20 In particular,
the statute details that the accused must have knowingly provided or
obtained the labor or services of a person through the following means: (1)
force, threat of force, physical restraint, or threat of physical restraint; (2)
serious harm or threats of serious harm; (3) abuse or threatened abuse of
law or legal process; or (4) mental coercion.21 The Forced Labor Statute
expanded upon the coercive methods in the Involuntary Servitude Statute
to incorporate in the definition of “serious harm” nonphysical harms such
as psychological, financial, or reputational harm, which under the
14. See infra Part II (comparing the Forced Labor Statute with the Involuntary
Servitude Statute).
15. See infra Part III (arguing that the Sixth Circuit incorrectly used Involuntary
Servitude Statute cases as precedent for Toviave).
16. See infra Part IV (outlining the implications that Toviave has for the
exploitation of children).
17. See infra Part V (concluding that the Sixth Circuit incorrectly applied the law
to the facts of the case).
18. See United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 625 (6th Cir. 2014) (referring to
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.2 (West 2014)).
19. See id. at 626 (implying that the Forced Labor Statute and Involuntary
Servitude Statute are analogous through the court’s use of many cases concerning
Involuntary Servitude throughout the opinion).
20. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (2008).
21. See id.

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss4/5

4

Niazi: Resurgence of Forced Labor

2015]

RESURGENCE OF FORCED LABOR

689

surrounding circumstances would compel a reasonable person to continue
performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring harm.22
1. Interpreting What Constitutes Forced Labor Under § 1589
The Federal Forced Labor Statute was originally enacted in 2000 as part
of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”).23 The Forced Labor
Statute was revised in 2008 to allow for one or any combination of four
means to constitute forced labor under the statute, including force or threat
of force and serious harms or threats of serious harm.24 Due to the recent
introduction of the Forced Labor Statute, very few courts have had the
opportunity to examine and interpret it. The Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Calimlim examined the revised Forced Labor Statute for one of
the first times when addressing the Calimlim’s claim that the statute was
overly broad and unconstitutionally vague.25 In Calimlim, Irma Martinez
traveled to the United States from the Philippines at 19-years-old to work
as a housekeeper for the Calimlims.26 Upon her arrival, the Calimlims
confiscated her passport and told her that she had to work to pay off the
cost of her plane ticket.27 Thereafter, the Calimlims confined Martinez to
the house and prohibited Martinez from contacting anyone outside the
home.28 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Calimlims’ convictions of forced
labor.29 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the Calimlims had intentionally
manipulated the situation so Martinez would feel compelled to remain by
causing her to believe that if she did not perform the work that she would
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2) (2008) (expanding the definition of serious harm
from that of involuntary servitude found in 18 U.S.C. § 1584).
23. See Claudia G. Catalano, Validity, Construction, and Application of Section
112 of Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and Subsequent Reauthorizing
Provisions Amending Chapter 77 of Title 18, United States Code, 75 A.L.R. FED. 2D
467, 21 (2013) (detailing that the Trafficking Victims Protection Act criminalizes and
seeks to prevent human trafficking of women and children for the purpose of
exploitation).
24. See id. (clarifying the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1589, which permitted “one or any
combination of four means: (1) force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of
physical restraint to that person or another person; (2) serious harm or threats of serious
harm to that person or another person; (3) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal
process; or (4) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that,
if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person
would suffer serious harm or physical restraint”).
25. See generally United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding
the forced labor statute provides sufficient notice of what it criminalizes).
26. Id. at 708.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 709.
29. Id. at 718.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

5

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 5

690

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 23:4

suffer serious harm.30
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit examined the application of the Forced Labor
Statute in United States v. Nnaji.31 The Fifth Circuit convicted the Nnajis
of one count of forced labor after illegally bringing a Nigerian widow who
spoke little English to the United States to look after their child so she
could earn money for her own children.32 Once she arrived, her household
responsibilities and the number of children she was to care for increased,
the Nnajis did not give her a room, and repeatedly sexually assaulted her.33
The widow worked for the Nnajis for over eight years without pay. 34 The
Fifth Circuit held, that under the Forced Labor Statute, serious harm could
include psychological coercion, such as lying to the Nigerian widow in an
attempt to coerce her to continue working for the Nnajis.35 These lies
included telling the widow that they deposited money into a bank account
and sent money to her children in Nigeria.36
B. The Federal Involuntary Servitude Statute
The Sixth Circuit attempted to analogize the Federal Forced Labor
Statute with the Federal Involuntary Servitude Statute in its analysis of
Toviave and, in doing so, cited many cases involving the Involuntary
Servitude Statute.37 The statute holds responsible any person who
“knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude . . . any person for
any term . . . .”38 Regarding the supposed analogous nature of the
30. See id. at 713 (finding that the Calimlims compelled Martinez to remain by
keeping her passport, not admitting their actions violated the law, and not offering to
normalize her presence in the United States); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(4) (2008).
31. See United States v. Nnaji, 447 Fed. App’x 558, 560 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding
that no manifest miscarriage of justice occurred when the district court found the wife
guilty of forced labor and conspiring to commit forced labor).
32. Id. at 559.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 560 (finding further evidence of psychological coercion
demonstrated by other actions taken by the Nnajis, including prohibiting the victim
from making contact with outsiders and accompanying her whenever she left the
house).
36. See id. (concluding these lies were meant to coerce the Nigerian widow into
continuing to work for the Nnajis).
37. See United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 626 (6th Cir. 2014) (referring to,
for example, United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1988), where a forcedlabor sweatshop run by a parent of one of the victims did not immunize the parent from
being charged with involuntary servitude).
38. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1584 (West 2014) (defining involuntary servitude and the
penalty involved for anyone who violates the statute).
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Involuntary Servitude Statute to the Forced Labor Statute, the Sixth Circuit
in Toviave briefly examined United States v. Kozminski.39 In Kozminski,
two men with low IQs worked on a dairy farm seven days a week, at first
for pay and eventually for no pay.40 The Defendants, the Kozminksis
physically and verbally abused the two men and instructed other workers to
do the same.41 Additionally, the Kozminskis told the two men not to leave
the farm and threatened them with institutionalization if they did not do as
told.42 The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals by
holding that the compulsion of services by the use or threatened use of
legal or physical coercion is a necessary incident of involuntary servitude.43
The Sixth Circuit further expanded on its definition of involuntary
servitude in the case of United States v. King.44 The case concerned a
religious commune in Michigan where the leaders, including defendant
King, were accused of holding children in involuntary servitude.45 The
members of the commune were subject to “chastisement” for refusing to do
assigned work or violating camp rules.46 The court found that the leaders
of the commune used and threatened to use physical force to make the
children perform labor and that the children believed that they had no
alternative but to perform that labor.47 The court further found that the
work performed by the children benefited the commune leaders
personally.48 The court determined that the “severity, frequency, and
39. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 626 (raising concerns that the United States v.
Kozminski decision relating to the Supreme Court’s opinion on the Thirteenth
Amendment “was not intended to apply to ‘exceptional cases’ . . . such as ‘the right of
parents and guardians to the custody of their minor children or wards’”).
40. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 935 (1988).
41. See id. (using coercive methods such as denial of pay, subjection to
substandard living conditions, and isolation to cause the men to believe they had no
alternative but to work on the farm).
42. See id. (specifying on one occasion that Kozminski threatened one of the men
with institutionalization).
43. See id. at 953 (holding further that there is no exception to the use or
threatened use of physical or legal coercion where the victim is a minor, an immigrant,
or mentally incompetent).
44. See generally United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1281 (6th Cir. 1988).
45. See id. at 1279 (describing the camp as having a playground for the children
with no fences or barriers around the perimeter).
46. See id. (describing that the commune punished those who disobeyed rules and
orders by fining members, making them dig large holes, and eventually beating them
for transgressions).
47. See id. at 1280 (stating that the activities of defendant members of the cult
group encompassed parts of the Kozminski standard for finding involuntary servitude).
48. See id. (detailing that the children cut wood and did farm chores, while the
commune leaders would then sell the wood, eggs, milk, and other products of the
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widespread nature” of the beatings displayed the specific intent to coerce
the children to perform the duties the commune leaders ordered them to
do.49 Thus, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the
leaders willfully held the children in involuntary servitude.50
C. Michigan’s Laws Regarding Child Abuse, Labor, In Loco Parentis
Michigan’s child abuse and labor laws recognize that a person who is not
related to the child or who is not their legal guardian act in loco parentis
and assume parental rights.51 The status of in loco parentis is generally
granted to people who are acting in place of a parent to children unrelated
to them.52 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin defined the term in loco
parentis in McManus v. Hinney when analyzing whether two minor
plaintiffs could recover against their stepfather for injuries allegedly
resulting from their stepfather’s negligence while operating an
automobile.53 The court held that the stepfather did not have standing in
loco parentis at the time of the accident thereby prohibiting recovery
against him.54 In reviewing the meaning of in loco parentis the court found
that the term refers to “a person who has fully put himself in the situation
of a lawful parent by assuming all the obligations incident to the parental
relationship and who actually discharges those obligations.”55 The court
further specified that the person assuming the status of in loco parentis
must have “a true interest in the wellbeing and general welfare” of the child
with whom they want to establish a parental relationship.56
The Michigan Appeals Court in Hush v. Devilbiss Co. further examined
the status of in loco parentis.57 In Hush, Hush’s grandchildren came to stay
with her for three years and she “virtually served as their mother” during

children’s labor back to the community and deposit the money into bank accounts
controlled by the leaders for their own benefit).
49. See id. at 1281 (leading the children to believe they had no viable alternative
but to serve the leaders of the commune).
50. See id. at 1283.
51. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.2 (West 2014) (asserting the rights of
parents of unemancipated minors).
52. See United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 625 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating a
person standing in loco parentis has the same rights as a parent).
53. See McManus v. Hinney, 151 N.W.2d 44, 45 (Wis. 1967).
54. See id. at 48 (holding that a reasonable basis existed that the minors’ stepfather
did not intend to assume the status and obligations of a parent to the minor plaintiffs).
55. See id. at 46 (quoting Rutkowski v. Wasko, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1955)).
56. Id.
57. See Hush v. Devilbliss Co., 259 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
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that period.58 The court found a “family unit” easily recognizable when
someone genuinely stands in loco parentis to a child; specifically noting
that the person assuming the status must voluntarily assume parental
responsibility and attempt to create a home-like atmosphere for the child.59
D. The Sixth Circuit Court Decision in United States v. Toviave
In United States v. Toviave, Toviave emigrated from Togo to the United
States in 2001 and eventually settled in Michigan.60 In 2006 he contacted
his girlfriend, Helene Adoboe, in Togo and asked her and the four children
in her care to come and live with him in the United States.61 Adoboe and
the children entered the United States with false immigration documents
and lived with Toviave until their relationship ended and Adoboe and
Toviave separated in 2008, leaving the children with Toviave.62 Toviave
demanded obedience from the children, who continued to live with him,
and beat them for minor oversights or for breaking arbitrary rules.63
Toviave beat the children with his hands, plunger sticks, ice scrapers, and
broomsticks.64 The children were responsible for different domestic tasks
such as cooking, cleaning, and laundry.65 Toviave also forced the children
to pack up the house when the family moved, serve food to his guests, iron
his clothes, clean his van, and babysit.66
After the children’s teachers reported suspected child abuse an
investigation ensued leading to the subsequent charges filed against
Toviave.67 Toviave pled guilty to visa and mail fraud and proceeded to
trial on forced labor charges.68 Toviave appealed his conviction of four
58. See id. at 171 (commenting that Hush took care of her grandchildren for three
years and performed the day-to-day tasks of taking care of the children during the
children’s most crucial years in terms of personality development).
59. See id. at 173 (stating that a person standing in loco parentis is an exception to
the abrogation of immunity since they exercise parental authority).
60. United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 624 (6th Cir. 2014).
61. See id. (explaining that of the four children brought by Adoboe, two are
Toviave’s cousins with an unknown “degree of consanguinity”, one is Toviave’s sister,
and one is Toviave’s nephew).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. (stating that Toviave hit the children for using loose-leaf paper instead
of a notebook to do homework and hit one of the children with a broomstick for
throwing a utensil in the sink).
65. See id. (listing the household chores the children were responsible for).
66. See id. at 624, 626 (stating that Toviave enforced these chores through abusive
force).
67. Id. at 624-25.
68. See id. at 625. (presenting other charges brought against Toviave included
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counts of forced labor under the Federal Forced Labor Statute with respect
to the four children.69 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that
Toviave’s treatment of the children did not constitute forced labor.70
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Three Arguments in Toviave Fail to Distinguish This
Case From Those Concerning Forced Labor
The Sixth Circuit uses three arguments in an attempt to distinguish
Toviave from other cases concerning forced labor.71 The court explained
that Toviave’s actions did not constitute forced labor for three reasons: (1)
making children do household chores cannot be forced labor without
making parents and guardians into federal criminals; (2) using child abuse
to compel a child to do housework does not change the nature of the work;
and (3) if these actions constitute forced labor, it would federalize the stateregulated area of child abuse.72 In using these three arguments, the Sixth
Circuit unsuccessfully seeks to justify its overall conclusion that the
Federal Forced Labor Statute does not apply to the circumstances in
Toviave.73 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit argues that the government
attempts to overextend the state crime of child abuse and the performance
of household chores to the federal crime of forced labor.74
1. The Sixth Circuit Incorrectly Argues That Making Children Do
Household Chores Cannot Be Forced Labor Without “Making Responsible
Parents and Guardians into Federal Criminals”
The Sixth Circuit makes an assumption that the Federal Forced Labor
Statute is not specific enough to prevent the “most responsible American
parents and guardians” from being convicted for exercising their parental

human trafficking, which the government later dropped).
69. Id.
70. See id. (reasoning that to treat household chores and homework enforced
through child abuse as forced labor would convert the Federal Forced Labor Statute
into a federal child abuse statute or convert the requirement of household chores into a
federal crime).
71. See id. (explaining that Toviave’s actions do not constitute forced labor for
three reasons).
72. See id. (listing the Sixth Circuit’s reasons for not convicting Toviave under the
Federal Forced Labor Statute).
73. Id. at 629.
74. See id. at 623-24 (“Only by bootstrapping can this combination of two actions
that are not federal crimes — child abuse and requiring children to do household chores
— be read as a federal crime.”).
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rights responsibly.75 However, under the statute, specific standards must be
met in order to support a finding of forced labor, thus demonstrating how
grave the situation must be to convert mere afterschool chores into a
federal crime.76 For example, the situation would need to be similar to the
situation in Calimlim, where the Calimlims restricted Martinez’s day-today activities and forced her to work for sixteen hours a day, seven days a
week.77 The Calimlims effectively isolated Martinez from others by
restricting her interactions.78 These restrictions included not allowing
Martinez to see anyone outside the Calimlims and limiting her contact with
her family.79 This example illustrates the strict standards of the Federal
Forced Labor Statute.
In Toviave the Sixth Circuit incorrectly drew a generalized distinction
between household work and forced labor by focusing solely on the type of
work rather than the intensity and severity of the overall situation.80
However, the Sixth Circuit ignores the fact that the statute is specific
enough that it would not automatically condemn a parent or guardian who
merely makes a child perform simple chores and punishes them as a
reasonable parent or guardian would when they fail to complete those
chores.81 The Seventh Circuit in Calimlim rejected this very claim raised
by Calimlim that the Forced Labor Statute was vague by finding that the
statute gives sufficient notice as to what it criminalizes.82 In Calimlim, the
75. See id. at 625 (reiterating that convicting parents and guardians under the
Federal Forced Labor Statute regarding household chores would make the “most
responsible American parents and guardians into federal criminals”).
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008) (specifying that the accused must have knowingly
provided or obtained the labor or services of a person through the following means: (1)
force, threat of force, physical restraint, or threat of physical restraint; (2) serious harm
or threats of serious harm; (3) abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4)
mental coercion).
77. See United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 708-09 (7th Cir. 2008) (adding
that Martinez had to take care of the household, children, cars, and other properties
while being restricted to day-to-day activities).
78. See id. at 709 (detailing Martinez could not use the front door of the house,
could not play outside with the children, and was not allowed to go to the same church
too many times in a row).
79. See id. (recounting that Martinez could not seek medical care outside the
house, even for special needs, and was only allowed to speak with her family four or
five times over the nineteen years she was with the Calimlims).
80. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625 (separating the issues of abuse from the
household chores).
81. See Calimlim, 538 F.3d at 710 (addressing the Calimlims argument that the
forced labor statute is so vague that it punishes innocent activity).
82. See id. (finding that vague statutes pose two primary difficulties: (1) they fail
to provide due notice so that ordinary people can understand the prohibited conduct;
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Seventh Circuit suggested that even if the Calimlims did not know for
certain that their conduct was prohibited under the Forced Labor Statute,
the language of the statute would alert them that it was prohibited.83 While
the Seventh Circuit outright rejects the argument that the Forced Labor
Statute is vague, the Sixth Circuit nonetheless justifies its argument on this
very premise.84 In particular, the Sixth Circuit asserts that the Federal
Forced Labor Statute is not specific enough to preclude the “most
responsible American parents and guardians” from being convicted for
exercising their parental rights responsibly.85
Furthermore, by the Sixth Circuit referring to domestic work as merely
“household chores,” it diminishes the fact that tasks like cooking, cleaning,
and caring for children constitute actual labor.86 Domestic workers
perform tasks that are physically and emotionally demanding and work
long hours, which are often longer than a typical work day.87 Numerous
states have ratified or are introducing bills granting domestic workers labor
rights that they do not receive under the Fair Labor Standards Act.88 The
introduction of these laws demonstrates the attitude shift towards rightfully
viewing domestic work as real employment.89
and (2) they encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement).
83. See id. at 711 (finding that the language of the Federal Forced Labor Statute
clearly prohibits the Calimlims’ actions, including telling Martinez that if she did not
do everything that they said, the Calimlims would not send money back home and
warning Martinez about her immigration status).
84. Compare Calimlim, 538 F.3d at 710 (proclaiming that the Federal Forced
Labor Statute is not overly broad), with Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625 (assuming that the
Federal Forced Labor Statute could be read so broadly as to not be able to distinguish
between responsible discipline and federally criminal abuse).
85. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625.
86. See id. (stating that the work the children did around the house were merely
household chores).
87. See
Domestic
Work,
NAT’L DOMESTIC WORKERS ALLIANCE,
http://www.domesticworkers.org/domestic-work (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) (detailing
the daily work lives of domestic workers).
88. See Mass. Leads On Protecting Rights For Domestic Workers, NAT’L
DOMESTIC WORKERS ALLIANCE,
https://www.domesticworkers.org/news/2015/mass-leads-on-protecting-rights-fordomestic-workers (last visited May 8, 2015); see Julia Quinn-Szcesuil, What Families
Need to Know About the Domestic Workers’ Bill of Rights, CARE.COM, https://www.
care.com/a/what-families-need-to-know-about-the-domestic-workers-bill-of-rights1402241514 (last visited May 8, 2015) (recognizing The California Bill of Rights,
effective January 1, 2014, and the Massachusetts Domestic Workers Bill of Rights,
effective April 1, 2015, which extend similar protections granted to laborers under the
Fair Labor Standards Act to domestic workers).
89. See NAT’L DOMESTIC WORKERS ALLIANCE, supra note 87, at 1.
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In an effort to lend support to its argument, the Sixth Circuit crafted a
hypothetical in an attempt to analogize and lend support to its overall
conclusion in Toviave.90 The court hypothesized a situation where a parent
requires their child to make his or her bed and mow the lawn, the child is
quarrelsome and occasionally refuses to do his or her chores, and in
response, after warning the child, the parent spanks the child.91 However,
the Sixth Circuit incorrectly analogized to its own hypothetical involving a
parent-child interaction because the facts in Toviave present a significantly
different scenario.92 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit claims that there is no
way to distinguish between the hypothetical situation of a parent spanking a
child due to disobedience and Toviave beating children under his care with
a broomstick or an ice scraper for using the wrong type of paper for their
schoolwork.93 However, the Sixth Circuit undermines its own analogy to
this hypothetical by suggesting that Toviave may be prosecuted under
Michigan’s child abuse laws.94 By suggesting that Toviave’s conduct may
amount to child abuse in Michigan, the Sixth Circuit acknowledges that
Toviave is not merely enjoying whatever parental rights he has, but rather
is using force to ensure that the children under his care complete the tasks
given to them.95 Furthermore, the Forced Labor Statute explicitly states
that “serious harm or threats of serious harm” is a means of obtaining
forced labor, and a reasonable person would find it difficult to say that a
spanking would constitute a serious enough harm to fall under the
governance of the forced labor statute.96 Therefore, based on the statutory
language, the Sixth Circuit’s argument that applying the Forced Labor
Statute to the situation in Toviave would make responsible parents and
guardians into federal criminals when they reasonably discipline their
children is unfounded.97
2. Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s Decision, Using Abuse to Compel a Child
90. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625 (claiming the government’s interpretation of the
forced labor statute makes a federal crime out of harmless, accepted parental rights).
91. See id. at 625-26.
92. See id. (oversimplifying the situation and comparing the children in Toviave to
a merely, “disobedient” child).
93. See id. at 626.
94. See id. (suggesting that the case could be tried under Michigan’s child abuse
laws).
95. See id. at 625 (stating that Toviave’s conduct essentially amounts to child
abuse).
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2) (2008) (defining the term “serious harm” as
physical or nonphysical that compels a reasonable person of the same background and
in the same circumstances to perform the labor or services to avoid harm).
97. See § 1589; Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625.
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to Do Chores Changes the Nature of the Housework
The Sixth Circuit argues that using child abuse to compel a child to do
household chores does not change the nature of the work.98 The Sixth
Circuit insists on reading the issues regarding the amount of work Toviave
subjected the children to and the coercive nature of child abuse separately,
instead of acknowledging that linking them together could amount to
forced labor.99 The Forced Labor Statute details that the use of force or
physical threats to obtain the labor or services of another person can
constitute forced labor.100 In the present case, Toviave would beat the
children under his care with “his hands, and with plunger sticks, ice
scrapers, and broomsticks” for failing to follow his rules or for minor
oversights they committed.101 From these facts, one can infer that the
children lived in fear that failure to complete a duty or chore as asked
would lead to physical harm or the threat of physical harm.102 Indeed, this
constitutes abuse under the Michigan statute, but it can also amount to
physical coercion to perform labor or services under the federal statute.103
Under the Michigan child abuse statute, child abuse is an injury to the
physical condition of a child; similarly, under the Federal Forced Labor
Statute this line of reasoning follows as physical harm is used as a means to
obtain forced labor.104 Therefore, it is illogical to separate the issues of
forced labor and child abuse in the present case as the Sixth Circuit did.105
The court interprets the child abuse as a separate issue when it can become,

98. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625 (postulating that requiring a child to perform
household chores by means of child abuse does not change the nature of the work
performed).
99. See id. (“Apart from the abuse, the facts here amount to nothing more than
household chores.”).
100. See § 1589 (detailing that forced labor can be obtained by means of force or
threat of force, serious harm or threats of serious harm, or by any scheme, plan, or
pattern).
101. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 624 (cataloging the various ways in which Toviave
beat the children under his care for failing to follow his arbitrary rules).
102. See id.
103. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b (West 2012) (stating that a
person who knowingly causes a child physical harm commits child abuse), with § 1589
(declaring that whoever knowingly obtains labor by means of serious harm or threats of
serious harm commits forced labor, serious harm being any harm to compel a person to
continue performing the labor to avoid incurring that harm).
104. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b (West 2012) (defining “physical
harm” in the context of the statute); § 1589 (defining “serious harm” in the context of
the statute).
105. See § 750.136b.
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as in the Toviave case, a contributing factor to forced labor.106
The Sixth Circuit argues that the government’s interpretation of the
Forced Labor Statute make “a federal crime out of . . . innocuous, widely
accepted parental rights” and presents a hypothetical concerning a child
who is “quarrelsome” and refuses to do his chores whom thus receives a
spanking.107 As mentioned above, this hypothetical is not analogous to the
facts in this case where instead of a “spanking” the children are beaten with
objects and treated much more severely than the hypothetical child.108 The
Sixth Circuit attempts to draw comparisons to this faulty hypothetical
because, while it is within a parent or guardian’s right to discipline a child,
it is not within his or her right to beat his or her children, as evidenced by
the existence of child abuse statutes throughout the United States.109 It is
clear that there is a difference between the Sixth Circuit’s hypothetical
child that receives a warning and a spanking and the children in Toviave
who were beaten with an ice scraper for failing to do chores.110 Perhaps
most importantly, the two differ because Toviave’s use and threat of
physical abuse amounts to forced labor.111
Furthermore, physical coercion is not the only coercive method of
obtaining forced labor.112 The Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Nnaji
that under the Forced Labor Statute serious harm could include
psychological coercion.113 In Nnaji, the Nnajis lied to the Nigerian widow
to coerce her into continuing to work for them.114 These lies included
telling the widow that they deposited her salary into a bank account and
sent money to her children in Nigeria.115 However, the Sixth Circuit
106. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625 (stating that without the child abuse, the facts of
the case would just be household chores).
107. See 761 F.3d at 625 (“Take a hypothetical parent who requires his child to take
out the garbage, make his bed, and mow the lawn. The child is quarrelsome and
occasionally refuses to do his chores. In response, the child’s parents sternly warn the
child, and if the child still refuses, spanks him.”).
108. See id. at 624 (referencing the severity of Toviave’s treatment of the children).
109. See, e.g., id. at 627 (referencing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b(5) (West
2012), and stating that child abuse is a state crime in all fifty states).
110. See id. at 624.
111. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136 (West 2012).
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008) (affirming that serious harm can be physical or
nonphysical, including psychological harm).
113. See United States v. Nnaji, 447 Fed. App’x 558, 559 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Serious
harm can include psychological coercion.”).
114. See Nnaji, 447 Fed. App’x at 560 (holding that prohibiting the victim from
making contact with outsiders and accompanying her whenever she left the house was
further evidence of psychological coercion).
115. See id. (concluding that lies were meant to coerce the Nigerian widow into
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incorrectly ignored this possibility of psychological coercion when
addressing the issues in Toviave.116
What the Sixth Circuit fails to realize is that child abuse has not only
physical effects on its victims but it also carries the potential to
psychologically harm its victims.117 Some of the immediate emotional
effects of child abuse include feelings of isolation, fear, and an inability to
trust as well as psychological consequences such as low self-esteem,
depression, and relationship difficulties.118 Isolating the victim is a
reoccurring factor in cases dealing with the Forced Labor Statute.119 In
Calimlim, the Calimlims kept Martinez isolated by restricting her daily
movement by not allowing her to be seen by anyone outside the family and
only allowing her to walk to church, but not allowing her to go to the same
church too many times in a row.120 Similarly, in Nnaji, the Nnajis kept
their victim isolated by prohibiting her from contacting outsiders and not
teaching her how to use the telephone, except in emergency situations, and
accompanying her whenever she left the house.121
The Sixth Circuit attempts to distinguish the facts in Toviave by arguing
that because Toviave permitted the children to go to school and participate
in soccer that they could not be considered as severely isolated from the
rest of society as the victims in Nnaji or Calimlim.122 While the Sixth
Circuit mentions psychological isolation in its opinion, the court
nevertheless fails to examine the potential psychological effects that the
continuing to work for the Nnajis).
116. See United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 626 (6th Cir. 2014) (addresses the
possibility of psychological coercion, but only in paradigmatic forced labor, such as
prostitution, sweatshop work, or domestic service).
117. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD
ABUSE
AND
NEGLECT
4
(2013),
available
at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/long_term_consequences.pdf
[hereinafter
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES] (asserting that the emotional effects of abuse can
translate into long-term psychological consequences).
118. See id. at 5 (outlining the emotional and psychological effects of physical child
abuse).
119. See Nnaji, 447 Fed. App’x at 560 (stating that isolation was further evidence of
the Nnajis coercing the victim into working for them); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1589
(2008).
120. See United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 708 (listing the ways in which
the Calimlims isolated Martinez from anyone outside of the family).
121. See Nnaji, 447 Fed. App’x at 560 (explaining that because the victim also
knew little English and was illiterate, it further isolated her from the rest of society).
122. See United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 621, 630 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating that
although the children could not have friends over or freely use the phone, their isolation
was not as severe as victims in other forced labor cases because they were allowed to
attend school and participate in after-school sports).
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children suffered from the abuse.123 The isolating effect of a victim
experiencing child abuse and the physical effect of the abuse in conjunction
with household chores could be considered a method of coercion to ensure
that the children did their housework.124 The Sixth Circuit failed to
consider the isolating factor that the children were brought to the United
States illegally from Togo and then left at Toviave’s residence by the
woman who brought them into the country.125 Though the trafficking
charges were dropped against Toviave, it does not change the fact that the
children came into the country with false documentation and were
separated from their former lives and their family in Togo.126 This is an
additional isolating factor that makes Toviave more analogous to other
cases involving forced labor, such as Calimlim and Nnaji, where the
victims were also brought into the country under false pretenses and
documentation and feared that if they left their work there would be legal
ramifications.127 The court overlooked this important factor that often
amounts to physical and psychological isolation in cases involving
individuals illegally brought to the United States.128
3. Federalization of the State-Regulated Area of Child Abuse Would Not
Occur if the Facts of Toviave Were to Constitute Forced Labor
The Sixth Circuit claims that if the facts of Toviave constituted forced
labor, the federalization of the state-regulated area of child abuse would
occur.129 The court argues that if the degree of force is what converts
123. See id. at 626-627 (acknowledging that all force is not physical, but can also be
psychological, such as isolation or pretend threats to the victim’s friends or family).
124. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008) (declaring that obtaining the labor of
another person by means of physical, serious harm is forced labor).
125. See Toviave 761 F.3d at 624 (explaining how the children came to be in the
care of Toviave).
126. See id. (noting that the children entered the United States with false
immigration documents).
127. See United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2008) (indicating
that Martinez entered the United States on a two-year visa and proceeded to stay and
work for longer); United States v. Nnaji, 447 Fed. App’x 558, 560 (5th Cir. 2011)
(stating that the victim travelled from Nigeria to the United States on a falsified
passport).
128. See FREE THE SLAVES, SLAVERY STILL EXISTS: AND IT COULD BE IN YOUR
BACKYARD (2008) (expressing that extremely limited contact with the outside world
isolates many victims, often without any understanding of the language or their
location) (removed from the website)(on file with Free the Slaves) (revised factsheet
available at https://www.freetheslaves.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/FTS_factsheetNov17.21.pdf).
129. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625 (postulating that if requiring a child to perform
chores by means of child abuse changed the nature of the work, then the forced labor
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household chores, which is not normally a federal crime, into federally
criminal forced labor then the mere presence of chores in child abuse
would convert the crime of child abuse into a federal offense.130 Child
abuse is already a criminally punishable offense in Michigan as well as
every other state, though the standards of what constitutes maltreatment
vary.131 Currently, no federal statute or law exists that specifically
criminalizes child abuse.132 The federal government has recognized that
the responsibility of child welfare services is a state responsibility. 133
However, the federal government does provide specific requirements and
guidelines that each state must follow in order to obtain federal funding for
certain child welfare programs.134 The Federal Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act (“CAPTA”) provides a minimum standard of what
constitutes specific, sexual abuse and special cases of neglect in federal
law.135 CAPTA does not provide for other types of maltreatment of
children such as physical abuse, neglect, or emotional abuse.136
Although no federal statute detailing and criminalizing physical child
abuse exists, one can argue that Toviave’s actions against the children he
cared for already fell under the federal umbrella of the Thirteenth

statute would federalize the state-regulated area of child abuse).
130. See id. at 627 (stating that, traditionally, Congress has been reluctant to
criminalize conduct that is denounced as criminal by the states) (citing United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
131. See id. (expressing that child abuse is already a state crime in the fifty states
and is traditionally local criminal conduct); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.136 (West 2012).
132. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
CONCERNED WITH CHILD PROTECTION, CHILD WELFARE, AND ADOPTION 1 (2012),
available
at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/otherpubs/majorfedlegis.pdf
[hereinafter, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION] (providing that each state has its own legal
and administrative structures and programs that address the needs of children).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 2 (proclaiming that federal legislation concerning child protection
and child welfare services prompt responses at the state level, including enactment of
state legislation, revision of state policy and regulation, and implementation of new
programs).
135. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106(g) (West 2010) (stating that child abuse and neglect is
failure on the part of the parent or caregiver which results in death, serious physical or
emotional harm, sexual abuse, or exploitation, or an act or failure to act which presents
an imminent risk of serious harm).
136. See Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect in Federal Law, CHILD WELFARE
INFO. GATEWAY, https://www.childwelfare.gov/can/defining/federal.cfm (last visited
Nov. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Definitions of Child Abuse] (asserting that Federal
legislation provides minimum standards of maltreatment for states that accept CAPTA
funding).
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Amendment.137 If Toviave’s actions already fall under the umbrella of the
Thirteenth Amendment, then the Sixth Circuit need not consider the
federalization of child abuse statutes.138 Toviave used abuse to compel the
children under his care to do their work around the house and punish them
when they failed to do so; therefore, Toviave’s actions may constitute
corporal punishment because while his actions were abusive, they were
meant to correct the actions and behavior of the children.139 The
government, in bringing the charges against Toviave, did not raise the issue
of child abuse; yet still, the Sixth Circuit chose to characterize Toviave’s
actions as child abuse in an attempt to limit its assessment of Toviave.140
The Sixth Circuit determined in Toviave that the Supreme Court
recognized that the Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to apply to
cases well established in the common law, such as the right of parents and
guardians to the custody and punishment of their children or wards.141
Using the Thirteenth Amendment to address the use of corporal
punishment or child abuse would not undermine the parent-child
relationship and parental rights as the Sixth Circuit has suggested; instead,
it would transform it into a tool to reinforce family integrity and values. 142
If the Thirteenth Amendment addresses corporal punishment, then it
follows that the use of abusive force, arguably more severe than corporal
punishment, would be addressed by the Amendment as well.
Although the Sixth Circuit fears that recognizing the facts in Toviave as
forced labor as defined under federal law would make child abuse a federal
crime, this fear is ill founded.143
The Forced Labor Statute, as

137. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
138. See United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 625 (6th Cir. 2014).
139. See Susan H. Bitensky, An Analytical Ode to Personhood: The
Unconstitutionality of Corporal Punishment of Children Under the Thirteenth
Amendment, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2013) (defining corporal punishment as
the use of physical force upon a child’s body with the intention of causing the child to
experience bodily pain so as to correct or punish the child’s behavior).
140. See United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 625 (6th Cir. 2014) (referring to a
juror in the trial court asking why the case was not tried under Michigan’s child abuse
laws).
141. See id. at 626 (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment and the Forced Labor
Statute were not meant to overturn longstanding parental rights).
142. See Bitensky, supra note 139, at 42 (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment
has regulated families for over a century without undermining parental authority).
143. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 623-24 (asserting that treating household chores and
required homework as forced labor because it was enforced by abuse would turn the
Forced Labor Statute into a federal child abuse statute).
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implementing legislation for the Thirteenth Amendment, is so narrowly
defined that it remains unlikely that a parent or guardian who is merely
abusive and requires chores would be prosecuted for forced labor.144
Another way to address the Sixth Circuit’s concerns over a parent or
guardian’s potential for prosecution for forced labor is to create a federal
child abuse statute or a federal standard that defines physical child abuse.145
A federal standard would strengthen current state child abuse laws as states
could still determine the maximum, but the federal standard would institute
a national minimum concerning child abuse.146
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Use of 18 U.S.C. § 1584 as an Analogy to the Forced
Labor Statute Was Incorrect
The Sixth Circuit, in its assessment of the facts, attempted to use the
Federal Involuntary Servitude Statute and several cases pertaining to it,
including Kozminski and King, as an analogy to the Federal Forced Labor
Statute.147 The revised Federal Forced Labor Statute allows for one or any
combination of four means to constitute forced labor, including force or the
threat of force and serious harms or threats of serious harm.148 In contrast,
the Federal Involuntary Servitude Statute specifically deals with those who
knowingly and willfully hold someone in involuntary servitude or who
sells someone into any condition of involuntary servitude.149 Involuntary
servitude is not limited to “chattel slavery-like” conditions, but as intended
under the Thirteenth Amendment, involuntary servitude is meant to cover
situations where an employee is physically restrained by guards, or where

144. But see id. at 625 (misconstruing the Forced Labor Statute as being overly
broad).
145. See Definitions of Child Abuse, supra note 136, at 2 (presenting that although
there are federal child welfare standards, there is no federal law dictating what
constitutes as child abuse).
146. See id. (indicating that new federal legislation prompts states to enact
legislation and revise current state agency policy and regulations).
147. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 626 (stating that the two statutes were analogous
when giving the example of United States v. Kozminski).
148. See Catalano, supra note 23 at 467 (clarifying the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1589
which permitted “one or any combination of four means: (1) force, threats of force,
physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person; (2)
serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another person; (3) the abuse
or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended
to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services,
that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.”).
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2008) (stating that whoever willfully holds another
person in involuntary servitude or sells them into any condition of involuntary
servitude or brings someone so held into the United States will be subject to penalties).
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the servitude is created by a credible threat of imprisonment.150 Both
statutes are contained in Chapter 77 of Title 18, however the Forced Labor
Statute was introduced in the TVPA, which was enacted to provide new
tools to combat human trafficking in the United States.151 The addition of
the Forced Labor Statute indicates that Congress felt the need to
specifically define the term “forced labor” in law.152 The mere existence of
a separate statute dealing with forced labor should have alerted the Sixth
Circuit that analogizing Toviave to a case concerning involuntary servitude
was not sufficient.153 The Forced Labor Statute was enacted as a response
to United States v. Kozminski, a case the Sixth Circuit relied on in its
analysis, which interpreted the Involuntary Servitude Statute to require the
use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion in cases of involuntary
servitude.154 The Forced Labor Statute is a result of the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Kozminksi and expands upon the Involuntary Servitude
Statute’s definition of the types of coercion that might result in forced
labor, a factor the Sixth Circuit failed to consider.155 Under the Forced
Labor Statute, coercive methods were expanded to include in the definition
of “serious harm” nonphysical harms such as psychological, financial, or
reputational harm.156 The Sixth Circuit’s heavy reliance on involuntary
servitude cases like Kozminski severely limited its ability to identify the
type of serious harm present in Toviave, such as the severe psychological
effects and feelings of isolation caused by abusive force.157 In fact, the
150. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Application of Section 1 of the 13th
Amendment to United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Amend. XIII, § 1, Prohibiting
Slavery and Involuntary Servitude—Labor Required by Law or Force Not as
Punishment for Crime, 88 A.L.R.6th 203, 1 (2013) (discussing involuntary servitude
and how the Thirteenth Amendment was passed in response to American slavery yet
extends to every race and individual).
151. See Involuntary Servitude, Forced Labor, and Sex Trafficking Statutes
Enforced, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/crm/1581fin.php (last
visited Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Involuntary Servitude] (providing a brief background
of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act).
152. See id. (stating that the provisions introduced in TVPA were meant to
primarily supplement the Involuntary Servitude Statute).
153. But see United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 626 (6th Cir. 2014) (claiming
that the Forced Labor Statute is closely analogous to the Involuntary Servitude Statute).
154. See Involuntary Servitude, supra note 151 (stating that a conviction under §
1584 requires the victim be held against his or her will by actual force, threats of force,
or threats of legal coercion sufficient enough to compel a person to service against a
person’s will).
155. See id. (providing a brief history of the Forced Labor Statute).
156. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2) (2008) (expanding the definition of serious harm
from that of involuntary servitude found in 18 U.S.C. § 1584).
157. See generally United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 626 (6th Cir. 2014)
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Supreme Court in Kozminski, when presented with the issue of
psychological harm as a method of compulsion of services, refused to
apply it to the situation because it feared that it would criminalize “a broad
range of day-to-day activity.”158 By continuing to use the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Kozminksi, the Sixth Circuit is applying an outdated version of
the law, because Kozminski was decided before the Forced Labor Statute
was enacted, and failing to look to the expanded definition of coercion as
presented in the Forced Labor Statute.159
However, even if a court finds the Involuntary Servitude Statute is
analogous to the Forced Labor Statute then the Sixth Circuit should more
closely examine United States v. King in this situation instead of
Kozminski.160 The facts of King are relatively similar to those in Toviave as
it involves disobedient children subjected to “chastisement,” including
severe beatings, for their refusal to do assigned work, or violation of the
camp rules.161 In King, the parents of the children consented, orally and in
writing, to commune leaders beating and using physical threats against
their children to force them to work.162 The Sixth Circuit in King stated
that the severity, frequency, and widespread nature of the beatings
demonstrated that the commune leaders had the intent to subjugate the will
of the children.163 The work the children performed also benefitted the
commune leaders personally, as well as the community members.164 The
(referring to numerous involuntary servitude cases as support, such as United States v.
Kozminski and United States v. King, as precedent for the present case).
158. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949 (1988) (using the example
that under the Government’s interpretation of psychological coercion, § 1584 could be
used to punish a parent who coerced his or her child to work in the family business by
threatening to withdraw affection).
159. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 626 (using the language found in Kozminski as
support to the Sixth Circuit’s argument that the Thirteenth Amendment was not
intended to apply to the rights of parents and guardians over their minor children).
160. United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1277 (6th Cir. 1988).
161. See id. at 1279 (stating that the implementation of the new whipping policy
was meant to instill fear in both the adults and children of the commune).
162. See id. at 1278 (referring to the commune leaders’ claims that because the
children’s parents consented to the beatings and physical threats, the commune leaders
were insulated from criminal liability because they shared the parents’ immunity under
the Thirteenth Amendment).
163. See id. at 1280 (finding that the District Court made alternative findings to the
“brainwashing” standard found in United States v. Mussry, and correctly applied the
Kozminski test).
164. See id. (detailing that the children would cut wood and do farm chores such as
collecting eggs and milk, which was then sold by the commune leaders and the
proceeds from which were placed in bank accounts controlled by the commune leaders
for their personal benefit).
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situation of the children in King is extremely similar to that of Toviave,
because in both cases parents and guardians used abusive force, or allowed
others to use abusive force, such as physical beatings, to compel the
children to complete tasks.165 In Toviave, these tasks also included work
performed by the children for the benefit of Toviave, who, according to the
Sixth Circuit, by virtue of Adoboe leaving the children with him, acted in
loco parentis.166 The children in Toviave cleaned the house, babysat for
Toviave’s girlfriend, cooked him food, and many other things that
personally benefited Toviave.167 The Sixth Circuit in Toviave even
acknowledged that the duties assigned to the children by Toviave are
“labor” in the economic sense of the word.168 Similarly, just as the Sixth
Circuit argues that the children in Toviave were not significantly isolated
because they were allowed to attend school and afterschool sports, a
comparable argument could be made in King where the commune had no
fences or barriers to force the children to stay and a playground was
available for recreation.169 Furthermore, the possible psychological
consequences of the abuse the children in Toviave and King suffered
effectively isolated them from the outside world and psychologically
compelled them to feel they have no choice but to remain in their
situation.170
Also, the plight of the children in Toviave reflects the conditions that the
restavek children in Haiti face.171 Restavek children are usually children
165. Compare United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 624 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating
that Toviave would beat the children in his care if they misbehaved or failed to follow
the rules), with King, 840 F.2d at 1280 (evidencing that the commune leaders used and
threatened the use of physical force to make the children perform labor).
166. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 624, 626 (according to the Sixth Circuit, by taking
responsibility for the children after his girlfriend left, Toviave was acting in loco
parentis).
167. See id. at 625 (listing household tasks undertaken by the children, including
washing the floors, windows, and bathrooms, doing the dishes, preparing food, and
doing laundry).
168. See id. at 626 (acknowledging that domestic tasks were labor in the economic
sense because people often pay employees to perform that type of work).
169. See id. at 624 (detailing that Toviave bought the children sports equipment and
took them on family trips); see also King, 840 F.2d at 1279 (specifying that the camp
had an area for swings and other playground equipment for the children and a lack of
fences or barriers around the perimeter of the camp).
170. See LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES, supra note 117, at 4 (addressing how
physical abuse carries the potential to psychologically harm the victim and result in
long-term psychological consequences).
171. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625 (describing the conditions the children lived in);
see also Restavek, RESTAVEK FREEDOM, http://www.restavekfreedom.org/theissue/restavek (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) (describing the conditions of restavek
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born in poor rural areas, who are brought into the homes of strangers or
family members in urban areas to perform domestic work, typically in
exchange for receiving an education.172 The majority of restaveks are
never sent to school and forced to work day and night; restaveks who do go
to school are expected to return immediately after and work late into the
night.173 Like the children in Toviave, some restavek children get the
opportunity to earn an education, but the conditions to which they are
expected to return are recognized by the Global Slavery Index as conditions
of forced labor.174 The restaveks are expected to cook, wash dishes and
laundry, shop for groceries, and care for small children, the same tasks that
Toviave expected from the children under his care, subjecting them to the
constant threat of physical, psychological, and sexual abuse.175 Federal
bodies, such as the Department of State, recognize the plight of the
restavek as an issue of forced labor; therefore, logically, children living in
similar conditions of forced labor in the United States should be afforded
the protection of the Forced Labor Statute.176
C. Toviave Did Not Possess Parental Rights Over the Children
The Sixth Circuit in King found the theory that a parents’ right to
discipline their children could shield the commune leaders, a third party, as
an unacceptable defense.177 This point brings into question Toviave’s
relation to the children and whether he stood in loco parentis to the
children.178 The Sixth Circuit acknowledges that Toviave was neither the

children).
172. See Restavek, supra note 171 (defining the Creole term restavek and giving the
English translation, which is “to stay with”).
173. See Restaveks: Haitian Slave Children, END SLAVERY NOW,
http://endslaverynow.org/learn/photos/restaveks-haitian-slave-children (last visited
Apr. 9, 2015) (offering insight on the daily lives of restaveks).
174. See Elisabeth Braw, Global Slavery Index Catalogues Forced Labour Around
the
World,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
17,
2013,
12:29
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/global-slavery-index-forced-labourworld (exploring the problem of forced domestic labor around the world).
175. See Restavek, supra note 171.
176. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, 2014 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 1, 195-97,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/226846.pdf (recognizing
restaveks as forced laborers).
177. See King, 840 F.2d at 1281-82 (referring to a Justice Department finding that
parental consent cannot shield third parties from liability after examining the legislative
history of the predecessor § 1584, which was meant to prevent the exploitation of
Italian children under the “Padrone” system).
178. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625 (asserting that Toviave was not the parent or
legal guardian of any of the children).
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legal parent nor guardian of any of the children he lived with and that
Toviave’s ex-girlfriend, who brought the children with her from Togo, had
left.179 An adult acting in loco parentis to a child is charged with a parent’s
rights, duties, and responsibilities and is entitled to custody and control of a
child.180 It is arguable that even though Toviave cared for the children in
the sense of providing them with shelter and sending them to school, the
abusive force he rendered upon them violated parental responsibility and
stripped him of his parental rights.181 Child abuse is a felony criminal
charge and generally results in the parent losing custody of his or her
children.182 Following this reasoning, Toviave cannot rely on the argument
that it is within his rights as a parent or guardian to the services of the
children as he has lost his rights through the abuse he inflicted upon
them.183 Therefore, if it was appropriate for the Sixth Circuit to use the
Involuntary Servitude Statute as an analogy to the Forced Labor Statute, it
should have used United States v. King as an analogy to Toviave, based on
the similarity of the facts; it would only follow that Toviave would be
found guilty under the Federal Forced Labor Statute.
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
There are grave implications of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Toviave, especially at a time when there are an estimated 60,000
children that will cross the border from Mexico and Central America into
the United States.184 Oftentimes, these children journey across the border
alone and unaccompanied to escape violence, persecution, and poverty in
their home countries.185 With the influx of unaccompanied children into
179. See id. at 624-25 (identifying that of the four children brought from Togo, one
was Toviave’s sister, two were distant cousins, and one was his nephew).
180. See id. at 625 (referencing Hush v. Devilbiss Co., 259 N.W.2d 170 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982)).
181. See Hush v. Devilbliss Co., 259 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
(noting specifically that the person assuming the status of in loco parentis must
voluntarily assume parental responsibility and attempt to create a home-like
atmosphere for the child).
182. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b (West 2014) (providing definitions
of child abuse and the penalties involved).
183. See United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1282 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that
parental consent cannot shield third parties from liability).
184. See Unaccompanied Minors: Humanitarian Situation at US Border, UNHCR:
THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, http://unhcrwashington.org/children (last visited Nov. 19,
2014) [hereinafter Unaccompanied Minors].
185. See id. (stating that crime and violence has recently increased dramatically in
Mexico and Central America and so have the number of asylum-seekers, increasing
712% from 2008 to 2013).
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the United States, the possibility of them being exploited also rises,
especially with the Toviave decision.
Because these children are coming across the border unaccompanied, it
is inevitable that cases similar to Toviave will arise; therefore, there is a
pressing need for the courts to recognize that the combination of abuse and
household chores can constitute forced labor if the situation falls under the
Forced Labor Statute.186 The facts presented in Toviave could easily apply
to any child who comes to the United States without documentation and
makes them vulnerable to exploitation.187 The migrant children, due to
their circumstances, are easily isolated from the rest of society by anyone
who potentially takes them in and intends to force them to perform
services.188 Furthermore, like in Toviave, the unaccompanied children are
away from their home country and any familiar surroundings; in many
cases, language can be another isolating factor as well as the legal
ramifications of being in the United States without proper documentation,
such as detention and deportation if the Sixth Circuit decision stands.189 By
assuming the status of in loco parentis, like Toviave, whoever takes these
children in can potentially use physical abuse to compel them into
performing household chores and would not face federal penalties so long
as they allow the children to go to school and participate in after school
activities.190
V. CONCLUSION
As Susan H. Bitensky stated in an article shortly after the decision in
United States v. Toviave, the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Toviave is, “an
extraordinary and unnecessary soul-murder of the innocents.”191 Due to the
lack of caselaw addressing the connection between child abuse, household
chores, and forced labor, the courts must reexamine this issue with more
scrutiny. The Sixth Circuit attempted to use three faulty arguments to

186. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008).
187. See United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 624 (6th Cir. 2014) (detailing the

children’s legal status in the United States and the manner in which they were brought
to the United States).
188. See id.
189. The U.S. Child Migrant Influx, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
http://www.cfr.org/immigration/us-child-migrant-influx/p33380 (last visited Dec. 4,
2014) (detailing what occurs once migrants are apprehended).
190. See generally United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 624 (6th Cir. 2014).
191. See Susan H. Bitensky, A Bungling Barbarism: Court Baselessly Holds That
Child Abuse, Used to Get Kids to Do Chores, Cannot Be Forced Labor, JURIST,
http://jurist.org/forum/2014/08/susan-bitensky-abuse-labor.php (last visited Nov. 7,
2014).
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distinguish Toviave from other cases concerning forced labor.192 The first
of these three arguments suggested that household chores could not be
forced labor without “making responsible parents and guardians into
federal criminals.”193 This statement implies that the standards of the
Federal Forced Labor Statute were so broad that responsible parents would
be held as federal criminals for having their children do reasonable
amounts of housework.194 Through examining another forced labor case
from the Seventh Circuit, United States v. Calimlim, from the Seventh
Circuit it becomes clear that the Federal Forced Labor Statute sufficiently
outlines the conduct it prohibited.195
The Sixth Circuit further argued that using child abuse to compel a child
to do household chores did not change the nature of the work.196 The court
went so far as to separate the issues of abuse and chores, and ignore the
language of the Federal Forced Labor Statute, which clearly states that
forced labor can be obtained by means of force or threat of force and
serious harm or threats of serious harm.197 In addition to the physical
coercion that Toviave employed to force the children under his care to do
work, the court ignored the psychological coercion that resulted from the
child abuse.198 The court seemed to disregard the element of psychological
coercion in forced labor even though it is listed as an element of the Forced
Labor Statute.199 The Sixth Circuit also failed to take into account the fact
that the children were illegally brought into the United States and then left
with Toviave by the person who accompanied them from Togo, isolating
them from familiar surroundings.200
The Sixth Circuit finally argued that allowing the government to address
the situation in Toviave as forced labor would federalize the state-regulated
area of child abuse.201 The Sixth Circuit’s fear of federalization is

192.
193.
194.
195.

See Toviave, 761 F.3d at625.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that
the language of the Federal Forced Labor Statute clearly prohibits certain actions).
196. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625 (suggesting that using child abuse to compel a
child to do chores does not change the nature of the work).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008); Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625.
198. LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES, supra note 117, at 4.
199. See § 1589(c)(2) (affirming that serious harm can be psychological harm); see
also United States v. Nnaji, 447 Fed.Appx. 558, 560 (holding that isolating the victim
from outside contact was evidence of psychological coercion).
200. Toviave, 761 F.3d at 630.
201. See id. at 625.
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unfounded.202 The Federal Forced Labor Statute is so narrowly defined, it
is unlikely that a parent or guardian who is merely abusive and requires
chores would be prosecuted under the statute.203 Through careful
examination of the case law the Sixth Circuit referred to in Toviave, it is
clear that the issue of child abuse and forced labor in the context of forced
labor needs to be examined again.

202. See supra Part III(A)(3).
203. See United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 2008).
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